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We should be clear about what we have not been saying. At no
point have we suggested that the courts should take primary respon-
sibility for the development of substantive policy under the Act. In-
stead, the objective of judicial review remains as it was under the
classical New Deal conception-to assure a full and focused airing
of plausible policy options before officials make decisions of
consequence.'
Apparently, we have not been clear enough. Smith and Randle read into
our article the very message we were at such pains to disclaim. They
suppose us intent on convincing the court of appeals to second-guess the
EPA on the merits of the scrubbing controversy. It is only on this premise
that they can think that their attack on five factual assertions could be
"central" 2 to our argument for judicial reversal of the EPA decision.
Far from being "central," these five factual points are entirely irrele-
vant. Rather than encourage courts to second-guess the EPA on the facts,
we aimed to encourage judges to guard against serious breakdowns in the
administrative process. At the center of our argument for judicial interven-
tion was a distinctive legal creature we called the agency-forcing statute:
Agency forcing provides a means for removing an issue from the
general run of agency discretion, directing policy in a particular di-
rection. At the same time, however, it signals a congressional recog-
nition that, after all, the issue requires the exercise of expert judg-
ment that cannot be applied directly from Capitol Hill. Thus, rather
than setting down regulatory policy in explicit statutory terms, the
agency-forcing statute contemplates careful policy reappraisal by the
agency before the congressional initiative gains the force of law.'
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
f J.D., Yale University, 1980; Law Clerk, Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., United States
District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia.
1. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466,
1565 (1980) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR 115 (1981) (book-length version) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR].
2. Smith & Randle, Comment on Beyond the New Deal, 90 YALE L.J. 1398-1401 (1981) [here-
inafter cited without cross-reference as Smith & Randle].
3. P. 1556; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 104.
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Agency forcing, we believe, provides a promising legal technique by which
a democratic legislature may deal creatively with the transparent dangers
of uncontrolled technocracy.4 Like any other legal technique, however, it
generates potential abuses of its own:
Simply put, it is the old Alphonse-Gaston problem: one player, Con-
gress, enacts an agency-forcing statute with the expectation that the
other will subject a particular policy to hard-headed consideration.
The other player, the agency, thinks that Congress has already made
the policy judgment and confines its policy review within narrow
bounds. As a consequence, each player allows the other to drop the
ball: an important policy is adopted without the hard thinking that
should be required of a sound law-making enterprise.'
Now our thesis is precisely that the Alphonse-Gaston story has been
reenacted in the scrubbing controversy. We tried to show that Congress
did not in fact make a considered judgment on the scrubber's environmen-
tal merits when in 1977 it passed a statute that forced the scrubbing ques-
tion onto the EPA's agenda.' Yet, when the issue was considered by the
EPA in 1978 and 1979, the agency did not attempt to subject the scrubber
to a full inquiry. Not once in the course of the EPA's multimillion-dollar
computer analysis did the agency seriously consider whether it was wiser
to modify its existing standards in ways that did not force all new power
plants to scrub their smokestacks.7 It is this decision to exclude, without
analysis, all non-scrubbing options that justifies judicial intervention.
To avoid such breakdowns, the court must adapt a classic function
of judicial review to the agency-forcing context .... Agency-forcing
statutes should be read in the light of the principle of full in-
quiry-requiring the fullest possible agency inquiry into competing
policy approaches consistent with the text of the agency-forcing
statute.8
Although the courts have no business deciding the environmental merits of
scrubbing, they can play a useful role by forcing somebody to take this job
4. P. 1567; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 121-23.
5. P. 1556; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 104-05.
6. Pp. 1487-1514; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 26-58.
7. Pp. 1536-56, 1559; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 79-103, 107.
A definitional clarification is in order. Our critics define "forced scrubbing" restrictively to embrace
only a program that forces everyone to scrub 90% of the sulfur dioxide out of their smokestacks. Smith
& Randle at 1399 n.10. This has never been our definition of the term; whenever the EPA forces
polluters to scrub despite the availability of cheaper cleanup options, it is engaged in "forced scrub-
bing" as we define it. See note 43 infra (discussing 1979 standard).
8. Pp. 1556-57; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 104-05.
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seriously before tens of billions of dollars are spent in the name of clean
air.
Since Smith and Randle seem to miss this argument completely,9 it is
hardly surprising that they say nothing to refute it. They do not point to
the place at which the EPA's multimillion-dollar computer study seriously
considers the many different ways we can clean the air without forced
scrubbing. Indeed, they are good enough to say that our "process critique
. . . makes a contribution" to environmental law.10 Yet only this "process
critique" justifies judicial intervention in an effort to prevent agency forc-
ing from degenerating into an Alphonse-Gaston burlesque.
II
If our substantive analysis of forced scrubbing was not intended for the
courts, for whom was it intended?
Congress-or more precisely, those congressional staffers, Washington
lobbyists, environmental bureaucrats, and academic commentators on
whom Congressmen rely when they try to make sense of the Clean Air
Act. Our goal was to convince Congress that it has overwhelmed its own
institutional capacities in its eagerness to clean the air. Congress must
abandon the pretense that it can function effectively as a
supertechnocrat-passing judgment on the merits of particular technologi-
cal means (the scrubber) of achieving environmental ends (controlling acid
rain). Rather than indulging in pseudotechnocratic judgments, Congress
should take far more seriously the task of defining the ultimate ends that
putatively justify our enormous national investment in a healthier envi-
ronment. The congressional goal should be to set well-defined environ-
mental targets and challenge the EPA to meet them in a cost-effective
fashion by a date certain, at which point future goals might be defined in
the light of past experience."
Our substantive analysis of the scrubber was part of this effort to per-
suade Congress to shift its attention from means to ends. By contrasting
the erratic way Congress considered the issue of forced scrubbing with the
9. In this they are not alone. In their arguments before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, none of the lawyers for any of the parties challenged the EPA's assumption that
the 1977 amendments restricted the agency to forced scrubbing solutions to the power plant problem.
The court itself took note of the central issues in a lengthy footnote, Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-
1565, slip op. at 18-20 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 1981), and called them "significant." It refused to confront
them, however, "because no party has raised them." Id. at 18. As a consequence of this failure in
advocacy, the court was induced to write a 253-page opinion that spends much energy on issues that
could well have been mooted by requiring the agency to give non-scrubbing options the hard look
required by the principle of full inquiry.
10. Smith & Randle at 1399.
11. Although these themes were sketched in our article, pp. 1566-71, they are developed more
fully in the concluding chapter of our book, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 116-28, 180-83.
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hypothetical deliberations of a competent policy analyst, we tried to show
just how poorly Congress was discharging the function of technological
assessment. In attempting this analysis, however, we were handicapped by
the failure of the EPA's multimillion-dollar study to confront the many
alternatives to a forced scrubbing policy. Moreover, it was clear to us that
two lawyers, working alone, could hardly fill this analytic gap with origi-
nal research on the host of questions required by a broader view of the
problem. The best we could do was to scavenge among existing EPA doc-
uments in search of the scattered data and analyses relevant to the critical
questions slighted by the EPA and Congress.12 Our aim was to assess the
inadequate data haphazardly generated by the administrative process."
Only in this way could we show how far Congress' pseudotechnocratic
pretensions allowed the EPA to avoid the hard work needed to shape a
cost-effective response to environmental realities.
Unfortunately, our critics' failure to grasp the institutional point of our
substantive analysis distorts their critique from the outset. In their view,
we were "attacking a straw man" 4 in scrutinizing the simple proposal to
force all new coalburners to scrub ninety percent of the sulfur out of their
smokestacks. But it was just this "full scrubbing" program that gained the
support of the bizarre coalition of environmentalists and dirty coal pro-
ducers responsible for amending the Clean Air Act in 1977.' s And "full
scrubbing" retains the support of organizations like the Sierra Club even
today,'6 when the Clean Air Act is once more the subject of systematic
congressional amendment. Given our concern with statutory reform, it
would have been a serious mistake to ignore the program that has thus far
dominated the congressional agenda.
Moreover, in criticizing "full scrubbing," we were seeking to under-
mine an even more basic element in the existing statutory structure-the
requirement that all new plants install "the best technological system of
continuous emission reduction"' 7 in the name of clean air. By showing
how this statutory command ultimately generated the forced scrubbing
fiasco, we sought to loosen the hold that high technology solutions have
had on the congressional imagination during the past decade. Congress
must rid itself of the notion that high technology solutions always provide
12. See pp. 1538-39; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 80-84.
13. See p. 1515; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 59-60.
14. Smith & Randle at 1402.
15. Pp. 1492-1511; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 29-54. See notes 43-47 infra for a discussion of
the standard the EPA actually adopted.
16. For example, the Sierra Club has taken the extraordinary position that § 111 requires the
EPA automatically to embrace full scrubbing and ignore analyses suggesting that competing cleanup
programs would have a superior environmental impact. For the reaction of the court of appeals to this
argument, see Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565, slip op. at 45-52 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 1981).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (Supp. 111 1979).
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the best way out of our environmental dilemmas. The goal must be to
clean the air in cheap and effective ways; this goal is often ill-served by
building fragile science fiction technologies into the exhaust pipes of in-
dustrial civilization. 8
Apart from its importance in congressional decisionmaking, "full scrub-
bing" also served as a heuristically convenient place to begin a more com-
prehensive analysis. Conceptually, "full scrubbing" is the simplest form of
forced scrubbing-it forces every new plant to scrub away the same per-
centage of sulfur dioxide regardless of the availability of cheaper cleanup
methods. By beginning with "full scrubbing," we could introduce some of
the fundamental issues raised by any policy of forced scrubbing without
immediately distracting the reader with a host of secondary complexities.
To begin with the basics, Smith and Randle seem to think that we
oppose forced scrubbing because we wish to impose some other technol-
ogy-for example, coal washing-on all utilities. t9 Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth:
Rather than imposing a high technology requirement on the utility
industry, the goal should be to force utility executives to seek out the
cheapest way of achieving further cutbacks. If reductions can be
achieved more cheaply by altering the operation of old plants or by
buying low sulfur coal, then it is these strategies that should be pur-
sued . . . .A host of market-like schemes have been proposed to
force polluters to recognize the social costs of their emissions and
take efficient steps to control further discharges. Under these sys-
tems, the burden of designing a cost-effective response is placed
where it belongs-on the polluters themselves, not on some govern-
ment bureaucrat.20
Rather than forcing all coalburners to clean up the same way-be it by
scrubbing or washing or burning low sulfur coal-we hoped to persuade
Congress to let each utility mix these and other cleanup measures in the
way that was cheapest given its particular circumstances. 2 1 If a coalburner
18. A similar story, we fear, can be told concerning the other triumph of technology-forcing-the
catalytic converter. See Mills & White, Government Policy toward Automotive Emissions Control, in
APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 342 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978).
19. They list several of our alternatives to forced scrubbing, Smith & Randle at 1400 n.15, includ-
ing "market-like schemes," but the rest of their critique assumes that we favor forcing utilities to use
specific technologies. See id. at 1406-08, 1410.
20. P. 1525; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 69.
21. We agree, of course, that in making this decision, utilities should be forced to consider the
second-order environmental costs generated by competing cleanup approaches. Yet it is hardly clear
that this factor strengthens the case for scrubbing, as our critics imply. The problem here is the
millions of tons of sludge that scrubbers will generate annually. Under the computer simulations made
by government consultants, the 1979 standard will generate between 14.4 and 26.7 million tons of
extra sludge a year by 1995. ICF INC., THE FINAL SET OF ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE NEW SOURCE
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will emit the same amount of sulfur dioxide by scrubbing high sulfur coal
or burning low sulfur coal, it should be permitted to choose the cheaper
option. Environmentalists have nothing to gain-and much to lose-if
they insist on adding billions of dollars to the cost of clean air for no
sound environmental reason. Of course, the producers of dirty coal will
have a vested interest in forcing utilities to scrub dirty coal rather than
burn a cleaner product.2  But one aim of good statutory design should be
to make it as difficult as possible for the dirty coal lobby to appropriate
clean air symbols for its own purposes.2'
Smith and Randle have not confronted this central argument. Their
comment does not even try to refute our claim that billions of dollars can
be saved by allowing new plants to comply with clean air standards by
burning cleaner coal, rather than scrubbing dirtier products.2 ' Nor do they
question our claim that for the next twenty years, the bulk of sulfur oxide
pollution will be contributed by existing coalburners that are often al-
lowed to pollute three or four times more heavily than comparable new
facilities. s Instead, they devote an entire section to an analysis of only one
of the ways that old plants can become cleaner-coal washing. By insist-
ing that their suppliers wash their coal at the mine site, old plants may
eliminate much of the pyritic sulfur that would otherwise be discharged
from their smokestacks.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR NEW COAL-FIRED POWERPLANTS C-II-18, C-IV-18 (June 1979)
(wet scrubbing cost figures) [hereinafter cited as ICF-IV]; id. at C-I-18, C-III-18 (dry scrubbing cost
figures). Moreover, a recent academic study reports, "since the sludge is neither biodegradable nor
firm enough to support structures, the end result is the permanent removal of land." Navarro, The
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: Energy, Environmental, Economic, and Distribuonal Impacts, 29
PUB. POL'Y 134 (1981). Although increased use of low sulfur coal will increase strip mining in the
West, see p. 1535 n.254; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 78, at least the stripped land is not irredeemably
lost.
Turning from clean coal to other forms of pollution control, our critics rightly emphasize that the
comparative environmental impact of stack scrubbing and coal washing deserves far greater attention
than it has been given. Indeed, we said the same thing in our earlier discussion. P. 1524 n.231; see
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 157 n.32. We suspect, however, that a closer study of second-order effects
will only suggest the folly of forcing all new power plants to meet their cleanup obligations in the
same way, without regard to ecological realities in the power plant's immediate neighborhood.
22. Pp. 1483-85; 1497-1501; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 17-19, 31-33.
23. P. 1514; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 57.
24. As we explained, see p. 1413 supra, the agency failed to consider any program that permitted
new plants to meet more stringent emission requirements by relying exclusively on low sulfur coal. As
a consequence, agency modelers never estimated the full cost savings that could be obtained if utilities
were allowed to engage in efficient cleanup measures. Pp. 1538-39; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 80-84.
At the very most, some computer simulations estimated the savings possible under partial scrubbing
options that permitted utilities to scrub less than 90% of the sulfur from their smokestacks. Some of
these options would save $800 million a year over full scrubbing by 1995 while achieving the
same-or greater-reductions in overall emissions. Pp. 1545 & n.324, 1528; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR 89-90, 169. Fully cost-effective approaches would result in much greater savings because they
would allow utilities to escape or defer the formidable capital costs involved in scrubber construction.
See note 47 infra.
25. Pp. 1522-23; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 66-67.
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In exploring the gains to be obtained from coal washing, we were very
pleased when our detective work uncovered two unpublished papers on
coal washing that the EPA's leading expert, James Kilgroe, presented at
conferences only months before our essay went to press. 6 It is our presen-
tation of these findings that has generated our critics' fire.27 We do not
understand, however, precisely what they wish to criticize. We reported
that one of these recent papers estimated that "the cost of washing high
sulfur coals ranges from two to nine cents a pound of sulfur dioxide re-
moved, compared to a cost range of seven to forty-five cents a pound for a
ninety percent scrubbing system." Our critics do not contest the accuracy
of this report, for the simple reason that this is what Mr. Kilgroe did
write. Nor can they deny that we placed this estimate in context with an
accompanying footnote which takes note of less optimistic estimates in the
very TVA study they emphasize:
Although Kilgroe and Strauss's optimistic assessment of coal
washing [reported in the text] seems generally supported by the stud-
ies they cite, there are studies that suggest a smaller cost advantage
in favor of washing. For example, a recent TVA study suggests that
average cost of scrubbing at 85% is only slightly greater than wash-
ing at about 35% . . . . Kilgroe, however, does not reconcile this
study's conclusions with the work that supports the cost comparison
cited in the text. More generally, the data base on washing costs
seems weak-reflecting the low institutional priority given the ques-
tion until very recently. 9
Randle and Smith do not explain why Kilgroe was mistaken in deciding
to deemphasize the TVA study and focus on other findings. Nor do they
deny that he is the leading EPA expert on these matters. What, then, are
they complaining about?
Rather than calling our attention to any study we ignored at the time
we wrote our article, Smith and Randle merely report that Kilgroe has
come up with new estimates during the past year. These unpublished
numbers do not suggest that we were wrong about coal washing. Appar-
ently Kilgroe now believes that washing high sulfur coal, at its cheapest,
26. Pp. 1481 n.55, 1523 n.229; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 136 n.3.
27. Smith & Randle at 1406.
28. P. 1523; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67. Our critics correctly point out that, in making this
comparison, Kilgroe did not include the exorbitant costs-ranging up to $2800 a ton-of washing low
sulfur Western coal. Kilgroe's omission, we think, was quite understandable because nobody-to our
knowledge-has seriously suggested coal washing at such high prices, especially when the extent to
which low sulfur Western coal can be washed is not even clear. By using Kilgroe's cost estimates,
then, we were simply reporting the costs involved in the range of options that seemed feasible to all
informed students of the subject. Cf Smith & Randle at 1407 n.60.
29. P. 1524 n.231; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 156 n.32.
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can remove sulfur dioxide for as little as $200 a ton, while the cheapest
scrubber can remove sulfur dioxide at a rate of $330 a ton." Why, then,
should the EPA insist on forcing all utilities to scrub their new smoke-
stacks if they can sometimes achieve an equivalent gain at a lower cost by
burning washed coal in their old plants?"1
Moreover, there is no reason to stop the economic logic at the point at
which the marginal cost of old plant washing equals that of new plant
scrubbing. Even washed coal can be very dirty, and utilities may cut back
sulfur dioxide substantially by shifting suppliers and buying cleaner coal
for their old plants . 2 They should be encouraged to take this and other
cleanup measures until the marginal cost of reducing emissions from dirty,
old plants equals the cost of making clean, new ones even cleaner.
33
Indeed, there are heartening indications that agency decisionmakers are
30. Smith & Randle at 1406 nn.55-56 (reporting coal washing costs ranging from $200 to $2800
a ton and scrubbing costs ranging from $330 to $1030 a ton). The high range of the coal washing
estimates reported by Smith and Randle merely emphasizes the exorbitant costs involved in washing
low sulfur Western coal-a project that no one, to our knowledge, has seriously proposed. See note 28
supra.
31. Consultants for the Business Roundtable have estimated that substantial savings can be
achieved nationwide by the adoption of more cost-effective air quality regulations. The Business
Roundtable study predicts that if the EPA set regional emission ceilings for old and new plants to-
gether at the levels which will be attained under the current regulatory scheme, but allowed utilities to
reduce emissions as efficiently as possible from either old and new plants, total annual control costs
could be reduced by 36% from $6.6 billion to $4.2 billion per year by 1990. NATIONAL ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF AIR QUALITY REGU-
LATION 7-14 to 7-17 (1980). Although we are generally familiar with the NERA model underlying
these predictions, we have not probed it deeply enough to make a considered judgment on the reliabil-
ity of these particular projections. See also J. Bromberg, Bubbling New Sources With Existing
Sources: An Examination of the Environmental and Economic Benefits of an Integrated Approach to
Emission Control 1, Table 0-1 (Dec. 1980) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (substantial cost savings
available by trading off new plant emission reductions for old plant controls).
32. As we explained in our earlier work, pp. 1483-84, 1551-52; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 17,
98-100, 138-39, 172-74, there is no reason to anticipate long-run problems in supplying utilities with
all the low sulfur coal they can use. Roughly 200 billion tons of the nation's demonstrated coal reserve
base has less than 1% sulfur content and produces less than two pounds of sulfur dioxide per MBTU.
NATIONAL COAL ASSOCIATION, COAL DATA 1978 (1980). In contrast, total utility coal consumption in
1980 was 568 million tons. Bituminous and Lignite Coal Consumption, Production, Imports and
Inventory, Preliminary, 1980 (not yet published figures provided by National Coal Association,
Washington, D.C.) (on file with Yale Law Journal). During the past decade Western coal produc-
tion, primarily low sulfur coal, has increased dramatically from 9% of national production in 1971 to
30% in 1980. P. 1484 n.66; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 138 n.12; Coal Production by State and Type of
Mining, 1980 (final) (not yet published figures provided by National Coal Association, Washington,
D.C.) (on file with Yale Law Journal). An EPA consultant states that excess capacity currently
afflicts coal mine operators and concludes that, given the substantial reserve base noted above, no
shortages will hinder the use of low sulfur coal from approximately 1986 onward. Interview with coal
supply analyst, ICF Inc., Washington, D.C. (Aug. 14, 1981). Most new plants subject to the EPA's
1979 NSPS requirement will become operational during or after that year.
33. See p. 1523; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67. This point is ignored by our critics whenever they
compare old plant washing with new plant scrubbing on the basis of each technology's cost of remov-
ing a ton of sulfur. See Smith & Randle at 1406-07. Such calculations fail to take account of the fact
that by shifting to lower sulfur coal, an old plant can lower the number of tons of sulfur dioxide it
will be obliged to remove by washing or other means, thus reducing total cost even if there is an
increase in the cost per ton of sulfur dioxide removed.
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at long last acting on this.basic point. EPA modelers are now preparing a
comprehensive estimate of the savings that are possible when utilities are
allowed to substitute old plant cleanup for new plant scrubbing. Although
these numbers have not been officially released at the time of this writing,
we are reliably informed that the savings are "substantial." 4 Precisely
this analysis was conspicuously absent in the rulemaking process our crit-
ics seek to defend. At the very most, they have proved something we have
never denied-that some new plant scrubbing may sometimes be the
cheapest way of meeting clean air requirements. When this is true, we are
happy to let the scrubbers keep scrubbing. Our only complaint is with
the agency's effort to force scrubbing when there are cheaper ways of
cleaning the air. 6
This basic point also eluded our critics in their discussion of the relative
speed with which non-scrubbing alternatives will clean the air. Rather
than considering the speed with which the supply of cleaner coals can be
expanded for use in old and new plants, our critics restrict their analysis
to the speed with which coal washing may be introduced. Once again, we
are criticized for relying on the only estimate that had been proffered by
knowledgeable EPA researchers at the time of our study: that coal wash-
ing could reduce Eastern sulfur dioxide emissions by "1 to 2 million tons"
and that new facilities could be built in three to five years." According to
Smith and Randle, "[t]his estimate did not include the time needed for the
EPA to develop, to propose, to promulgate, and to implement regulations
that would require universal washing practices, a process that could take
more than five years."3
But we do not advocate a universal washing requirement, let alone its
implementation through the time-consuming techniques of command-and-
control regulation that put such a premium on foot-dragging. Our point
was simply this: if the EPA had spent the 1970s forcing utilities to meet
clean air targets in a cost-effective manner, substantial gains could have
been obtained from coal washing as early as 1985, five to ten years before
equivalent gains can be expected from new plant scrubbing. 9 Rather than
34. Interviews with confidential sources, EPA Office of Policy and Resource Management, Wash-
ington, D.C. (July 1981); see note 31 supra (citing NERA report).
35. Pp. 1525-26; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 68-70.
36. P. 1524; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67-68.
37. Id. (citing J. Kilgroe, Coal Cleaning for Sulfur Oxide Emission Control 22, 28 (Apr. 8-9,
1980) (unpublished paper presented at Acid Rain Conference, Springfield, Va.) (on file with Yale
Law Journal)).
38. Smith & Randle at 1407.
39. P. 1525; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 68. Although Kilgroe's estimate, see note 37 supra, was
the only one available at the time we wrote our article, our critics point to a 1981 report by the
Environmental Law Institute predicting that coal washing requirements might take as long as 11
years to yield their full environmental benefit. Smith & Randle at 1408 n.67. But the report reaches
this conclusion only because its authors allow up to eight years for regulators to promulgate and
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responding to this point, our critics unwittingly demonstrate the irration-
ality of the present system when they note that as much as "twenty per-
cent of the additional capacity needed to clean all utility coal east of the
Mississippi" presently exists but is going unused.4" Why do we let such
opportunities for immediate sulfur reduction go ignored at the same time
that we insist on spending billions for scrubbers? 41
Our critics' discussion of coal washing, moreover, should not permit the
reader to ignore their even more pregnant silence. Whatever the truth
about using washed coal in old plants, our principal claim had to do with
the money that can be saved by allowing new plants to meet clean air
targets by burning low sulfur coal or by applying one of several forms of
technological treatment to dirtier products.2 Until this claim is addressed,
Smith and Randle have failed to consider, let alone to answer, the basic
charge of inefficiency we have leveled against the scrubber. Their protes-
tations to the contrary, they have not even begun to address the assertions
that are "central" to our argument about cost-effectiveness.
III
But, our critics rightly point out, the EPA did not impose a simplistic
full scrubbing program on the utility industry. Rather than forcing every
new coalburner to scrub ninety percent of the sulfur dioxide out of its
smokestacks, the agency allowed some coalburners to scrub somewhat less
compulsively. Under the EPA's "partial scrubbing" regulations, a utility
may be allowed to scrub as "little" as seventy percent of the sulfur dioxide
from its smokestacks if it promises to burn coal in the lower sulfur
grades. 43 According to Smith and Randle, we devote almost no attention to
implement a forced washing requirement-poignant evidence of the cumbersome nature of command-
and-control regulation. G. Wetstone & P. Reed, Institutional Aspects of Transported Pollutants: An
Examination of Strategies for Addressing Long Range Air Pollution Problems 46 (1981) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). In contrast, the Institute thinks it will take coal mines and utilities "0 to 3 years"
to bring their coal-washing equipment into operation, id. at 47, and lists coal washing among the
programs that "would pay off most quickly," id. at ix. Even at their most pessimistic, the Institute
estimates are not inconsistent with our earlier claims. An EPA program begun in the mid-1970s
would have been fully implemented by the mid-1980s.
40. Smith & Randle at 1408. Although the estimates are of poor quality, it seems that 40% of
Eastern coal is presently washed. Id.; p. 1523; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67, 156. Thus, by our
critics' account, currently excess capacity may be able to wash at least one-fifth of presently unwashed
production.
41. Smith and Randle do not report, and we do not know, whether the use of unused equipment
represents a cost-effective way of achieving additional sulfur dioxide reductions. Since the equipment
is already in the field, however, there can be no doubt that it provides one of the fastest ways of
cleaning the air.
42. P. 1526; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 69-70.
43. EPA regulations allow utilities to remove as little as 70% of the sulfur from their coal if they
achieve a 0.6 pound/MBTU emission level. 45 C.F.R. § 60.43c (1980).
Although the Clean Air Act explicitly forbids the Administrator to force a particular technology on
the utility industry, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(2) (Supp. III 1979), there can be no doubt that agency
officials believed that without scrubbers, coalburners could not effectively satisfy their demand for 70%
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this decision." This omission, it is claimed, undermines the value of our
substantive critique.
We are puzzled by these charges. Rather than ignoring the EPA deci-
sion, twenty pages of our article (and thirty-four of our book) are devoted
to an analysis of the EPA's decision to abandon "full scrubbing" in favor
of "partial scrubbing."'45 Moreover, it should be plain that the arguments
presented in the preceding section, and developed at greater length in our
previous work, apply in principle to all forced scrubbing programs, in-
cluding the one adopted by the EPA. To put the point in its general form:
it is inefficient to force coalburners to scrub away X percent of the sulfur
oxide produced by high sulfur coal if the utility finds it cheaper to cut
back emissions the same amount by burning unscrubbed low sulfur coal.
This is no less true when the X is set at seventy percent for some
coalburners than when it is set at ninety percent for all. Of course, partial
scrubbing will be somewhat less inefficient than full scrubbing, because
coalburners can avoid the high marginal costs of ninety percent scrubbing
if they can buy low sulfur coal more cheaply. But the fact remains that
EPA regulations forbid any plant to reduce the multibillion-dollar costs of
seventy percent scrubbing even when it is cheaper to clean the air through
non-scrubbing techniques.
Once again, then, Smith and Randle have only proved something we
explicitly asserted-that partial scrubbing will be less inefficient than full
scrubbing." Yet simply because this is true, it hardly follows that the
EPA cannot achieve its environmental goals more cheaply by other means.
To the contrary, so long as the agency merely permits some new plants to
scrub somewhat less assiduously, the EPA will cut only a fraction of the
needless cost imposed by its commitment to forced scrubbing."
to 90% sulfur dioxide removal. See Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565, slip op. at 104-07 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 29, 1981). Our critics also point out that "the use of a number of new technologies and anthra-
cite coal is deliberately encouraged." Smith & Randle at 1402. But anthracite accounted for 0.7% of
national coal production in 1980. Coal Production by State and Type of Mining, supra note 32. And
none of the experimental technologies have begun to establish their cost-effectiveness or reliability,
with the exception of dry scrubbing, to be discussed below. See pp. 1423-24 infra.
44. Smith & Randle at 1399.
45. Pp. 1536-56; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 79-103.
46. See pp. 1554-56. Indeed, when we expanded our Yale Law Journal article into book form, we
took special pains to construct a table that clearly showed the cost savings claimed for the partial
scrubbing program selected by the EPA compared to its full scrubbing competitor. CLEAN COAL/
DIRTY AIR 102.
47. How small a fraction is a matter of some dispute. At the very least, the EPA's partial scrub-
bing dispensation will allow some plants to avoid the extra costs involved in pushing their wet scrub-
bers to the limit of their sulfur removal capacities. But since the EPA's partial scrubbing program still
requires all plants to shoulder the heavy capital costs of scrubber construction, the fraction saved will
not be very large. As Smith and Randle note, see Smith & Randle at 1405 n.50, total operation and
maintenance cost does not exceed the annualized capital cost of scrubber construction, and the operat-
ing cost of 70% scrubbing remains substantial. ICF-IV, supra note 21, at B-11. Insofar as dry scrub-
bing is a feasible alternative, but see pp. 1424-25 infra, somewhat greater savings are possible.
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Turning from costs to benefits, it is best to define the precise area in
dispute. We have never denied that the EPA's forced scrubbing program
will result in modest reductions in sulfur dioxide loadings in most areas of
the country by 1995 4 -albeit at a needlessly high cost. Our claim was
that "the agency action is so inept that some of the nation's most populous
areas will enjoy a worse environment than would have resulted if the new
policy had never been put into effect. '49
As our article made clear, the most threatened region is a five-state area
in the industrial Midwest that presently accounts for about one-quarter of
the nation's entire sulfur dioxide loadings." The problem arises because
the EPA's forced scrubbing program only applies to new plants, and not
to old ones. Because forced scrubbing can add up to fifteen percent to the
cost of a new plant, the program gives utilities a strong incentive to delay
building clean, new plants and to rely on power from dirty, old plants for
as long as possible. In aging industrial regions, this "old plant effect" can
more than offset any gains obtained by new plant scrubbing for the next
fifteen to twenty years. After a study of all the available evidence, we
concluded that this was the likely fate of the Midwest.
In countering this pessimistic conclusion, our critics do not contest the
reality of the old plant effect." Instead, their only rebuttal consists of a
single computer run predicting that, despite the old plant effect, Midwest-
ern sulfur dioxide emissions will be reduced by three percent in 1995 as a
result of the adoption of the EPA's forced scrubbing program. 2 Computer
output, however, can be no better than computer input. The simulation
upon which our critics rely depends upon an overly optimistic model and
utterly speculative data.
Turning first to the data, our critics' computer scenario assumes that a
substantial percentage of utilities will abandon relatively familiar wet
Moreover, even if we restrict our attention to the partial scrubbing programs considered by the
EPA, it is not clear that the agency selected the least inefficient one. Our critics fail to comment, for
example, on a proposed standard that promised to achieve slightly greater emission reductions in
Eastern regions, along with slightly smaller nationwide reductions, at reduced nationwide costs, by
easing percentage reduction requirements and lowering the permissible emission ceiling. ICF-IV,
supra note 21, at 4, A-4a, A-6a (Alternative G) (0.55 pounds/MBTU ceiling; 33% reduction; dry
scrubbing cost assumptions).
48. Explicit statements to this effect may be found at p. 1555 & n.373, see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR 101-02 (1979 standard), and at pp. 1524, 1535-36, 1540-41, see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 68, 77-
78, 84-85 (1978 proposed standard).
49. P. 1469; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 2 (italics in original).
50. See pp. 1521, 1522 n.226, 1524, 1540 n.307, 1545; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 66 n.28, 68, 85,
90, & 166 n.11.
51. The EPA itself has formally acknowledged the potentially counterproductive impact of this
effect. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580, 33,607 (1979) (promulgation of 1979 NSPS, stating in part that
"[olne finding that has been clearly demonstrated by the two years of analysis is that lower emission
standards on new plants do not necessarily result in lower national SO 2 emissions when total emis-
sions from the entire utility system are considered").
52. Smith & Randle at 1403 n.40.
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scrubbing methods and install new "dry scrubbing" technology to take
advantage of the EPA's partial scrubbing regulation. 3 It is hoped that dry
scrubbers: (1) will be cheaper than wet scrubbers; hence (2) will reduce
the financial penalty associated with forced new plant scrubbing; hence
(3) will encourage utilities to replace old plants with new ones more
quickly;14 and hence (4) will ameliorate the "old plant effect" that espe-
cially afflicts the Midwest.
In appraising this argument, however, we emphasized that "there is no
dry scrubber operating on a full-sized power plant anywhere in the
United States."55 Moreover, we happened to be on the scene at the EPA
just at the time the dry scrubber came to the forefront of agency attention.
Our face-to-face interviews gave us no reason to place great weight on the
dry scrubbing data hastily conjured up by agency personnel during the
last weeks of decisionmaking"' Rather than taking our critics' uncritical
approach to the dry scrubbing computer scenario, we thought it far more
enlightening to explore the bureaucratic politics that led the agency to
embrace such weak data in the final weeks of agency deliberation.57
Smith and Randle fail to convince us that our approach was mistaken.
They do not direct us to the hard engineering data that putatively sup-
ported the EPA's dry scrubbing projections. Although they claim that a
1981 EPA report contains "more recent cost estimates [which] continue to
support the projected cost savings from dry scrubbing,"5 an inspection of
the document they cite reveals a different story. Rather than reporting any
new data, the new document blandly observes:
For new powerplants, the dry scrubber cost assumptions were those
used previously by EPA in their analysis of revised New Source Per-
formance Standards (NSPS). These were documented in an ICF re-
port entitled The Final Set of Analyses of Alternative New Source
Performance Standards for New Coal-Fired Powerplants, June
1979.19
In other words, no published EPA document indicates that the agency has
53. See ICF-IV, supra note 21, at C-I-3a, C-III-21.
54. Old plants need not be completely eliminated from the utilities' power systems before their
adverse effect on pollution may be reduced. So long as new plant scrubbing costs are not too high,
utilities may find new plants cheaper to run. As a consequence, they may operate older plants only
during periods when the power system experiences peak load demands and rely on clean, new plants
to provide energy during other parts of the daily consumption cycle.
55. P. 1555; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 102-03.
56. Pp. 1553-56; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 101-03.
57. Pp. 1550-56; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 97-103, 172-76 (more elaborate treatment); note
46 supra.
58. Smith & Randle at 1403 n.39.
59. ICF INC., INTERIM RESULTS OF ACID RAIN MITIGATION STUDY, app. III, at Il-5 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as ARMS REPORT].
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done anything to improve its cost estimates since the hectic days of deci-
sion in 1979.60 Rather than new data, all our critics have to report is that
"utilities have begun to build three full-scale plants" and "full-page ad-
vertisements are now appearing in trade publications.. 6 This is hardly
the stuff upon which to build serious estimates of operating costs and
reliability.
In contrast, our doubts about dry scrubbing are shared by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In its recent
review of the EPA decision, the court found that "it would be premature
to conclude that dry scrubbing is adequately demonstrated technology."6
Noting that only data from pilot plants were available to the agency, the
court wrote:
EPA does not attempt to explain how these results may be used to
predict performance in full scale plants throughout the industry
... . Furthermore, there is no test data at all available for the per-
formance of dry scrubbers burning low alkaline coal, which com-
prises roughly half of the supply of lower sulfur coal, and is more
difficult to clean than low sulfur coal with high alkalinity.63
Yet the last-minute modeling runs based on the EPA's unsupported dry
scrubbing extrapolations provide the sole support for Smith and Randle's
optimism about the Midwest. It is only when these undocumented hopes
are fed into the computer that the model predicts a three percent decline
in sulfur dioxide loadings in the Midwest in 1995. If, however, the dry
scrubber proves disappointing, and utilities are forced into wet scrubbing,
the EPA model bears witness to the "old plant effect" by predicting a
three percent increase in 1995 Midwestern loadings.6 4
Our pessimism about the Midwest, moreover, was hardly grounded
upon this single pessimistic computer run.65 Indeed, we think it very
wrong to make much of the difference between the model's prediction of a
three percent decrease in Midwestern sulfur dioxide (assuming dry scrub-
bing) and a three percent increase (assuming wet scrubbing). At the pre-
sent stage of its development, the EPA model can be sensibly used only to
gain a rough sense of the order of magnitude of the scrubber's environ-
60. We are reliably informed, however, that the EPA is now attempting to place its dry scrubbing
estimates on a firmer foundation. Interviews with confidential sources, EPA Office of Policy and
Resource Management, Washington, D.C. (July & Aug. 1981). We applaud this initiative and await
the new estimates with great interest.
61. Smith & Randle at 1402 n.38.
62. Sierra Club v. Costle, No. 79-1565, slip op. at 73 n.158 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 29, 1981).
63. Id. at 72 n.158.
64. Compare ICF-IV, supra note 21, at C-I-3a, C-III-21 (using dry scrubbing cost assumptions)
with id. at C-II-3a, C-IV-21 (using wet scrubbing cost assumptions).
65. Compare p. 1524 with pp. 1526-28; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 68, 70-72.
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mental impact. When read in this way, the computer printout contains an
important message that is obscured by undue reliance on trivial percent-
age changes. It suggests that, regardless of the wet-dry controversy, the
EPA's "partial scrubbing" program will not substantially improve the en-
vironment in the heavily populated five-state region that presently ac-
counts for about one-quarter of the nation's entire sulfur dioxide load.
This conclusion should be more than enough to cast grave doubt upon the
environmental value of the EPA's multibillion-dollar program. Surely we
can do better than this after spending billions of dollars?
Yet even this is to give the EPA's program too much credit. There is
every reason to fear that all the model's predictions are overly optimis-
tic-not by a percentage point or three, but by a lot. The critical point
involves the model's unrealistic treatment of EPA enforcement. Quite sim-
ply, the model assumes that the EPA will systematically detect and effec-
tively deter scrubber malfunction,66 thereby guaranteeing that plants will
continuously meet the seventy to ninety percent removal that the law re-
quires. We are entirely unpersuaded by Smith and Randle's effort to min-
imize the difficulty of enforcing scrubbing requirements on a day-to-day
basis. Their claim that "utilities must continue to pay for [scrubbers] once
they are built, whether or not they are used" 67 is only half true. We agree,
of course, that utilities must borrow billions when they build scrubbers
and that they must repay their debts regardless of the extent to which the
machines actually clean the air. It hardly follows, however, that utility
executives will delight at the prospect of spending an extra billion or so a
year by 1995 to keep the scrubbers scrubbing at high performance levels.
68
If they can cut hundreds of millions out of operating budgets without de-
tection, there is reason to fear that this will happen. Also there is no rea-
son to believe that they will divert many of their best employees away
from moneymaking tasks to scrubber superintendence. Yet without high-
quality personnel, the money spent on scrubbing will fail to yield high-
quality performance.
In making these points in our earlier work," we did not suggest that
they cannot be surmounted by a costly EPA enforcement effort that takes
full advantage of sophisticated monitoring systems. We emphasized only
66. P. 1539; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 82.
67. Smith & Randle at 1405.
68. Smith and Randle support their claim about operating costs by citing to the recently published
ARMS REPORT, supra note 59; we therefore generated our billion-dollar estimate using numbers
from this document. Id., app. III, at 111-12, 3-6. To be conservative, our calculations assume a 50%
capacity factor. We emphasize that we are speaking here only in the roughest terms. Finally, we note
that despite its 1981 date, the ARMS Report contains no new data on dry scrubbing costs, see id.,
app. III, at 111-5; pp. 1424-25 supra, and that the need for better data on this subject remains acute.
69. P. 1528; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 71.
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that neither the EPA nor the states have shown any indication of making
the intensive enforcement effort required to keep the scrubbers scrubbing
at peak performance levels.70 And so long as this remains the case, it
seems plain that a strategy that emphasizes low sulfur coal burning will
place a lesser strain on the limited enforcement resources likely to be
forthcoming.
This is so for at least three reasons. First, a low sulfur coal strategy
does not rely nearly so heavily on sensitive machines that deteriorate over
time. So long as the low sulfur coal gets to the power plants, regulators
need not be concerned with the way aging equipment is operating ten,
twenty, or thirty years after the first scrub. Second, a low sulfur coal
strategy can be enforced in a way that does not rely so heavily on a com-
plex effort to keep in constant touch with the nation's smokestacks:
When a utility decides to build a new plant, it either builds a "cap-
tive" mine or contracts for a guaranteed long-run supply [of coal]. It
is at this point-years before the first coal is burned-that enforce-
ment agents may intervene. To the extent possible, steps should be
taken to assure that the "captive" mine site will yield coal that will
uniformly satisfy the Clean Air Act's requirements."
Compared to constant smokestack surveillance, an intensive one-time
scrutiny of the proposed mine site seems a more manageable way for reg-
ulators to reduce the amount of sulfur dioxide discharged by the power
generating system. Of course, this early regulatory intervention at the
"captive" mine is hardly foolproof; coal from "low sulfur" sites can some-
times vary substantially in sulfur content when it is actually mined. 2
Nonetheless, an early regulatory check promises a sensible way of limiting
the overall amount of sulfur introduced into the system, and so limits the
total discharge that will occur if later, more complex, regulatory controls
break down. In contrast, forced scrubbing increases the demand for high
sulfur coal and so increases total emissions in the event of a breakdown in
subsequent stages of the control system.13
70. See p. 1527 n.243; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 159 n.42 (even before widespread use of scrub-
bers, 71% of "complying" sources in EPA study experienced incidents of excess emissions; excess
emissions of plants not in compliance averaged 25% of amount allowed by legal emission standard); p.
1482 n.59; CLEAN AIR/DIRTY COAL 137 n.6 (1978 survey of scrubber operation over two-month
period showed half of systems had less than 50% reliability during at least one month). EPA reports
published since our article suggest the existence of a continuing problem. See EPA, EPA UTILITY
FGD SURVEY: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1980 at xvii-xix (1981) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-81-012b) (1980
survey of scrubber operation over three-month period showed one-quarter of systems had less than
50% reliability during at least one month, based on 54 plants for which complete figures available; 30
other plants reported incomplete or no data).
71. Pp. 1531-32; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 74.
72. Pp. 1483 n.65, 1532 n.268; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 138 n.11, 161 n.58.
73. Pp. 1526-28; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 70-71.
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A final aspect of the power business generates a third enforcement ad-
vantage for the low sulfur coal strategy. Smith and Randle ignore the
common engineering practice of designing new plants to take advantage of
the particular properties of the coal they are expected to burn. By plan-
ning ahead for coal containing a predetermined sulfur and fly ash content,
new plants may be engineered to minimize corrosion and maximize boiler
efficiency. 4 This means that a utility cannot cheaply cheat on its low sul-
fur commitments by secretly substituting low cost, dirty coal for the more
expensive low sulfur product. Because such substitutions will increase the
cost of power plant operations, the utility must accept a penalty for its
illegal conduct. In contrast, the malfunction of a scrubber does not auto-
matically reduce utility profits. Thus, under the low sulfur coal option,
utilities directly bear at least part of the cost of illegal operation; under
scrubbing, all of this cost is externalized onto the people who breathe the
air.
This is not to say, of course, that a low sulfur coal strategy makes it
unnecessary for state officials to find out what is actually going on in the
plants under their supervision. And, despite our critics' contrary sugges-
tion, we are very much in favor of automatic monitoring and computer-
ized data collection." Our point is simply that, until the great day when
the EPA and the states have the resources and ability to put such a system
into effective operation, there is good reason to fear that forced scrubbing
will overwhelm the system's capacity to keep in touch with the nation's
smokestacks, and that over time, this enforcement failure will lead to rela-
tively low levels of scrubbing performance. 76 Rather than confront this
problem realistically, the EPA model assumes it away. But even without a
realistic treatment of enforcement, the EPA model fails to predict a signif-
icant improvement in Midwestern air quality. There is thus every reason
to fear that "some of the nation's most populous areas will enjoy a worse
environment than would have resulted if the new policy had never been
put into effect." 7
Indeed, despite Smith and Randle's effort to contest our claim, we do
not really believe that it is particularly controversial. Even at the time of
our original article, independent scholars had recognized that forced
74. Interview with Professor Gary Hailer, Yale University Department of Chemical Engineering,
New Haven, Ct. (Aug. 14, 1981).
75. Our critics seem to have missed a passage in which we express our preference for sophisti-
cated monitoring equipment. Pp. 1526-27; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 70.
76. P. 1528; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 71. Moreover, as Smith and Randle point out, Smith &
Randle at 1405 n.48, existing regulations do not even force utilities to police their own scrubbing
performance because the regulations fail to require utilities to report the data they collect on scrubbing
efficiency directly to their own employees operating the plant.
77. P. 1469; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 2. ,
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scrubbing had more to do with protecting dirty coal than assuring cleaner
air."8 And while we were writing this reply, yet another academic report
concluded: "Although there is a modest decline in national SO2 emissions,
the cost of achieving that reduction more than doubles; emissions rise in
the Midwest and sludge production increases dramatically.M
9
IV
Our critics voice a variety of other complaints. Treating each at length,
however, would be more tedious than instructive."0 We shall restrict our-
selves to those points where further dialogue might play a useful role in
defining the future agenda for research and policy discussion.
Begin with our critics' treatment of the impact of coal burning on
Western air quality. There is more common ground here than meets the
78. ENERGY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 378-81 (Ford Foundation 1979); Badger, New Source
Standard for Power Plants 1: Consider the Costs, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 48, 58-59 (1980);
Navarro, The Politics of Air Pollution, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1980, at 36. All of these sources were
cited in our earlier work. P. 1469 n.7; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 130 n.7. Even those most committed
to forced scrubbing have recognized the need to grapple with the impact of the "old plant effect" in
the Midwest. See Ayres & Doniger, New Source Standard for Power Plants II: Consider the Law, 3
HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 63, 80-81 (1979) (advocating use of standards far more stringent than EPA's
1979 requirements in effort to reduce effect).
79. Navarro, supra note 21, at 143. Although Navarro's reading of the EPA's modeling results
accords with our own, he buttresses his conclusions further by presenting predictions generated by
National Economic Research Associates (NERA) on behalf of the utility industry. We have not ex-
amined NERA's work carefully enough to make an informed evaluation of these particular
predictions.
80. Our lawyerly pride, alas, cannot allow four legal quibbles to pass unnoticed. First, there is the
complaint, Smith & Randle at 1400-01, that we fail to discuss the relevance of National Lime Ass'n v.
EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980), to our problem. As Smith and Randle note, the opinion in this
case was delivered by the D.C. Circuit on May 19, 1980. Since our article was to appear in the
Journals July issue, we did not think it necessary or appropriate to attempt a last-minute analysis of
this decision. Moreover, the court's intensive scrutiny of the EPA's substantive findings in that case
was hardly inconsistent with our view that the court should undertake a parallel judicial effort to
scrutinize the EPA's factfinding processes in the present case.
Second, there is the claim, Smith & Randle at 1401, that we ignored Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
606 F.2d 1068, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1979). We find this complaint puzzling, because Smith and Randle
themselves point to the very place in our article where Alabama Power is cited. Compare Smith &
Randle at 1401 n.25 with p. 1568 n.404; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 181 n.7.
Third, there is the charge, Smith & Randle at 1400, that we "completely ignoreld]" the PSD
program. Yet the relationship between forced scrubbing and PSD was in fact a centerpiece of our
analysis of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, see pp. 1493-96, 1501; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY
AIR 29-33, 39-41, and PSD also figured in our proposals for statutory reform, see p. 1567; CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR 123. See also p. 1431 infra (discussion of PSD).
Fourth, rather than "ignore statutory limitations and existing case law" in arguing that polluters
should be allowed to offset emission reductions between old and new plants, see Smith & Randle at
1401, we quite specifically referred the reader to § 111(b)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
741 1(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979) (administrator may distinguish among sources within given category of
sources), and to opinions such as ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
which interpret that section in a way consistent with our arguments. See p. 1568 n.404; CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR 181 n.7. We reject our critics' implication that any section of the Clean Air Act
restricts the modification of an old source when the modification results in reduced emissions. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(4), 7479(2)(C) (Supp. III 1979); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068,
1081 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (modification restricted only where increased emissions result).
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eye. Smith and Randle do not deny our basic point: in contrast to the
Northeast, coal burning in the West does not impose a significant risk to
human health or ecological integrity. Given the very low sulfur oxide con-
centrations presently prevailing in the West, scrubbing can serve only a
single social interest-it can reduce the risk that coal burning may impair
visibility and hence damage some of the awesome vistas that make the
Southwest and Rocky Mountain regions such special places.
Moreover, in assessing this threat, our critics do not dispute EPA re-
ports that power plants contributed only 430,000 tons of sulfur dioxide to
this region in 1976, compared to the 2.48 million tons imposed by smelters
in the same year.' Instead, Smith and Randle urge a refinement in the
way the EPA has modeled the power plant's impact on future Western
visibility. They note that the EPA's present model treats an eight-state
region-running from Arizona and New Mexico in the south to Montana
in the north-as if it could be considered as a single unit called the Rocky
Mountain region. They contend that if Arizona and New Mexico were
reserved for separate treatment, a computer analysis of the remaining six-
state Rocky Mountain region would reveal that power plants pose a more
serious threat to visibility. Without the benefit of such a study, we cannot
assess Smith and Randle's claim that forced scrubbing will significantly
reduce the "risk of creating regional haze problems" in their newly de-
fined region. We are, though, very much in sympathy with their main
point. As our earlier work emphasized, 2 much more work must be done
before we can gain an adequate sense of the power plant's impact on
Western visibility.
Indeed, our only problem with Smith and Randle's proposal is that it
does not go far enough. Even a six-state Rocky Mountain region is far too
vast to obtain more than a rough and ready understanding of visibility
effects. This region of 630,000 square miles should instead be divided into
a number of zones. The aim should be to locate those areas where, thanks
to wind and mountains, coal burning can proceed without seriously im-
pairing important scenic vistas. Such a technical effort provides the indis-
pensable foundation for a mature struggle with the ultimate value ques-
tions raised by the energy crisis. Given the weakness of present analysis,
81. P. 1534-35 & n.284; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 77, 163 n.66. If the EPA had done nothing
to change the old NSPS, the agency's modelers predict that power plants would increase their emis-
sion to 1.2 million tons in 1995. ICF-IV, supra note 21, at C-I-3b. Given the smelting industry's
successes in convincing Congress to defer their cleanup obligations, 42 U.S.C. § 7419(c) (Supp. III
1979) (smelter cleanup can be deferred until 1988), it seems likely that power plants will still be
generating less than half the region's sulfur dioxide fifteen years from now.
82. P. 1535; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 77. Indeed, our book-length treatment explicitly states
that the model's "regionwide figures are too aggregative to be very revealing as to the effects on
western visibility." CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 168 n.26.
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we also advocated requiring Western coalburners to design their plants to
permit cheap scrubber retrofits.83 This strategy will allow an effective reg-
ulatory response if real world experience reveals serious visibility
problems that are now obscured by overly aggregative modeling.
In making these points, we did not, as our critics suggest, ignore Clean
Air programs-notably the effort to protect pristine areas against deterio-
ration (PSD)-that do try to locate plants in places that will minimize
aesthetic damage. Although PSD does share the Act's fixation with high
technology solutions, we believe that it "promise[s] lasting environmental
gains over the long run."84 Unfortunately, however, the PSD program has
yet to become an effective tool for the prevention of visibility impairment.
The program has not yet tried to control total regional loadings of sulfur
oxides, which produce regional haze. Instead, the program concentrates on
effects measurable within thirty miles of power plants-even though sul-
fur oxide, a colorless gas, typically travels fifty to one hundred miles
before transforming itself into visibility-impairing sulfates. 5 Continued
congressional concern with visibility resulted in the passage of section
169A of the Clean Air Act in 1977, which orders the Administrator to
take a series of steps to protect visibility in key areas such as national
parks.86 Although the EPA has since proposed regulations,87 none has yet
been promulgated. Nevertheless, this kind of program deserves the highest
priority. Rather than spending billions on forced scrubbing, we should be
spending tens or hundreds of millions on the scientific and regulatory
foundations of present efforts, like the visibility aspects of the PSD pro-
gram, to force polluters to locate in places where they will do the least
aesthetic harm.
A similar effort should inform the regulation of power plant design.
Once again, there is a good deal of common ground here. Smith and Ran-
dle do not challenge our basic point that building tall smokestacks in-
creases the percentage of a plant's sulfur dioxide (SO 2) that remains air-
borne, thereby increasing the amount of SO 2 transformed into sulfates
(SO 4) as the wind carries it to places hundreds of miles away from the
point of origin. Nor do we deny that shorter smokestacks will increase
S02 concentrations in each power plant's immediate vicinity. The differ-
ence comes only in how we trade off nearby SO 2 against long distance
SO488
83. P. 1535; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 77.
84. This quotation is from CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 163 n.71. We deleted a similar sentiment
from pp. 1533-35 of our article in the cause of brevity.
85. P. 1534 n.282; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 76-77, 162 n.64.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (Supp. III 1979).
87. 45 Fed. Reg. 34,762 (1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 51).
88. See pp. 1518-20, 1531; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 62-64, 74.
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Smith and Randle view lower smokestacks with alarm, reminding us
that a concern with SO, concentrations has monopolized the "attention of
Congress, the agency, and industry over the past decade." '89 In contrast,
we view this fixation on SO2 as the problem, not the solution. Even when
the first sulfur dioxide objective was established under the Act, researchers
were perfectly aware that a concern with SO 2 hardly did justice to the
risks imposed by other sulfur oxides." And by 1978, the National Acad-
emy of Science could report: "The notion that ordinary concentrations of
sulfur dioxide alone are not likely to injure the lung is commonplace." 9'
In contrast, the past decade of research has focused upon the risks im-
posed by the acid rain and haze generated by the long distance transport
of sulfates.92 Rather than cling rigidly to a single obsolete policy goal, the
challenge is to redirect bureaucratic energies in a more fruitful direction. 3
We have called the problem the "freezing of hard variables." '94 Once a
particular indicator of program success has gained acceptance, it can long
outlive the scientific case originally made for its adoption. Not only will
high policymakers find it embarrassing to admit that billions have been
spent in the pursuit of a doubtful objective, but lower level officials will
resist the massive changes in bureaucratic procedures that may be re-
quired to pursue a new, and scientifically more plausible, goal.95 Yet, de-
spite bureaucratic embarrassment and inertia, is it not past time to redi-
rect the billion-dollar effort-from nearby SO2 to long-range SO 4?
Not that we have ever advocated a completely laissez-faire approach to
SO 2. "Although . . . conventional wisdom now belittles the effect of low-
level concentrations of SO2, nonetheless there is a point where higher con-
89. Smith & Randle at 1410.
90. P. 1516 n.198; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 61, 152 n.6.
91. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SULFUR OXIDES 133, 166-71 (1978). In its recently pub-
lished report, the National Commission on Air Quality describes some very "recent clinical research"
that "may provide more support for the current sulfur dioxide standard." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
AIR QUALITY, TO BREATHE CLEAN AIR 75 (1981). Unfortunately, however, the Commission did not
attempt to assess the quality of these studies; nor can we attempt to do so on our own.
92. P. 1517; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 61-62.
93. Indeed, it may well be that our proposal for shorter stacks was overly cautious, rather than
unduly iconoclastic. In a recent editorial, a leading chemist argues that coalburners should entirely
dispense with smokestacks and discharge emissions directly into the land surrounding the plant:
"[mlonitoring a single lake or conditioning one or two square miles of soil should be cheaper than
operating a pollution control plant or repairing half a continent." Schuerch, Why build smokestacks?
15 ENVT'L SCI. & TECH. 721 (1981).
94. P. 1569. Our label is intended to complement Laurence Tribe's discussion of a related phe-
nomenon in Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317-22 (1964). Tribe considers the way in which technocrats in search of
"harder data" may ignore unquantifiable values. Our point is that bureaucracies will find it difficult
to abandon one hard variable for another hard variable, even when the evolving facts indicate that this
second parameter is more relevant in policy formulation.
95. See p. 1521; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 65.
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centrations will begin to affect asthmatics and other sensitive groups."' 6
Moreover, we also noted that "shorter stacks will increase local concentra-
tions of other pollutants coming out of smokestacks-notably nitrogen ox-
ides and particulates. Thus, the final policy on stack size must be set with
a complex set of trade-offs in mind."'' 7 These complexities, however, make
it all the more important to confront the policy problem directly, rather
than invoke the older fixation upon SO. as an excuse for thought.
V
Although we have not been persuaded by any of our critics' arguments,
we cannot close without thanking them for taking the time and effort to
retrace our steps. In attempting our original substantive analysis, we were
constantly haunted by the fear that somewhere in the EPA's vast filing
cabinets lurked the comprehensive study of non-scrubbing alternatives that
was so obviously lacking on the surface of deliberations. Given the absence
of a neatly organized data set, we would not have been surprised if we
had missed an important document in our canvass of the files.
But despite their intimate acquaintance with EPA sources, Smith and
Randle have failed to produce a single relevant document that escaped our
attention at the time we completed our research fifteen months ago. 8 Nor
have they reported any new findings that call any of our major conclu-
sions into question. If anything, their critique suggests that the EPA re-
mains unaware of the hard scientific and regulatory work needed to shape
a cost-effective response to environmental realities.
Yet this continuing agency failure is merely a symptom of a larger in-
stitutional malaise. So long as Congress imagines that it can play
supertechnocrat, it will get the kind of analyses worthy of its pretensions.
The critical questions raised by forced scrubbing are not scientific but in-
stitutional. Will Congress continue to pretend to a technocratic compe-
tence it fails to possess? Or will it encourage the EPA to confront environ-
96. P. 1531; see CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 74.
97. CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 155 n.21; see p. 1531 n.266.
98. Although our critics suggest that we "ignored" the Teknekron Report managed by Mr. Smith
on behalf of EPA's Office of Research and Development, see Smith & Randle at 1402 n.35, we were
quite aware of this report's existence and discussed it with a number of agency officials, including Mr.
Smith. We did not cite the document only because we concluded that it played an insignificant role in
the EPA's rulemaking process. Rather than relying on Teknekron, agency decisionmakers looked to
the model developed by the EPA's Office of Planning and Management in collaboration with the ICF
consulting firm. Thus, all the modeling results the EPA published in the Federal Register are
grounded exclusively in the ICF model. See p. 1537 n.298; CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 164 n.4 (listing
these publications). Similarly, all the key decisionmakers and analysts we interviewed treated the ICF
model as the core of the analytic effort. We continue to believe that an elaborate treatment of the
Teknekron study would have pointlessly complicated an already complicated discussion of the agency's
rulemaking effort. For the same reason, we generally avoided detailed consideration of the studies
developed by the utility industry's consultants.
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mental realities in a cost-effective fashion and focus on the questions only
a legislature can answer: What are our environmental goals anyway?
Which ones should be given the highest priority? In what ways should the
air be cleaner ten years from now than it is today?
When we set out to write this reply, it was under the express condition
that our critics' commentary would remain unchanged. After reading our
reply, however, Messrs. Smith and Randle decided to add a new con-
cluding sectiona containing entirely new-and completely undocu-
mented-complaints. Since this material was forwarded to us just as our
manuscript was to go to the printer, a skeletal rejoinder must suffice.
So far as we can tell, there are three new charges. First, our work is
said to suffer from a "glaring lack of consideration of serious long-term
supply limitations in the low sulfur coal market."'b But footnote 32 of this
reply not only explicitly considers this problemc but points the reader to
lengthier discussions in our original article. Second, we are said to
"ignor[e] the serious effects of nitrogen oxides on both acid rain and visi-
bility."d Once again, the reader need only return to the text of this reply
to falsify this claim. Rather than ignoring nitrogen oxides, our discussion
of smokestack height emphasizes that "'shorter stacks will increase the
local concentrations of other pollutants coming out of smokestacks - no-
tably nitrogen oxides and particulates. Thus, the final policy on stack size
must be set with a complex set of trade-offs in mind.' "e Indeed, if our
critics had referred to the index to Clean Coal/Dirty Air, they would
have found several places in the book where the role of nitrogen oxides
was thought relevant f
Third, our critics deride our advocacy of "market-like schemes" for pol-
lution control as a "masquerade for serious analysis."g But such cavalier
treatment does an injustice to an enormous body of sophisticated litera-
ture. Our initial essay provided an introductory bibliography on the sub-
ject of cost-effective regulationh-which we had hoped would have been of
greater interest to EPA officials concerned with the agency's future.
a. Smith & Randle at 1410-11.
b. Id. at 1410.
c. See p. 1419 supra.
d. Smith & Randle at 1411.
e. See p. 1433 supra.
f. CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 190.
g. Smith & Randle at 1411.
h. P. 1525 n. 237; See CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 158 n.38.
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